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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~.\~ ,Jl'AN COUNTY and STATE
T.\X COl\11\l ~~~ION OF UTAH,
I)/a iII tiffs and Appellants_.

Case
No.

10146

vs
JEN. INC .. a corporation,

Defendant and Respondent.

AP·PELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEnii~NT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This case can1e on to be heard on defendant's motion
to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs' complaint
failed to state a clain1 upon which relief could be granted.
Thereafter, the parties stipulated additional facts not
sPt forth in plaintiffs' complaint as facts upon which
there was no dispute, and the matter was determined
as upon a motion for sumn1ary judgment by the defendant. whereupon judgment was entered for the defendant
in all respects. From such judgment for the defendant.
plaintiffs' appeal.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment and judgment in their favor as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, J en, Inc., is a Utah corporation.
At all times relative to the tax assessments referred to
hereafter, it owned and operated various unpatented
mining claims or h~d interests in said property situated
in and around San Juan County, Utah. More particularly, the defendant operated the J en, the Jackie, Uncle Ben,
Pasco, and a portion of' the Enigma Fraction mines.
Pursuant to Section 59-5-58, U.C.A. 1953, the defendant
rendered its statement to the 8tate Tax Commission
for operations for the years 1957, 19·58 and 1959. The
same statement of operations was filed in 19,60, based
upon the 1959 production of defendant's mines, with
a specific reservation that it was without admission
of any liability by the defendant for the payment of
any net proceeds tax owing for the year 19·60. The sum
of $288,204.50, together with interest and penalties,
was thereafter assessed against the defendant by the
plaintiff, State ·Tax Commission of Utah, as the amount
of net proceeds tax due for the year 1960. The Tax
Commission thereafter assessed the sun1 ·of $222,240.66
as the amount of net proceeds tax due from the defendant
for the year 1961, based upon two times the net average
annual proceeds for the preceding three calendar years,
the 1960 operations having been calculated at zero.
A similar assessment in the sum of $113,661.96, together
with penalties and interest, was assessed against de-
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fendant for tht- year 1962, based upon two times the net
avPntge annual proceeds for the three next preceding
yPar~ 1!J;J!l, 1960 and 1961, the 1960 and 1961 operations
having IH't-n ealenlated at zero.
~\s

of January 1, 1960 the mining claims mentioned

ahovP WPrP depleted and worked out and had no commPreial value as such. The last mining operation on said

<'laims wa~ in December, 1959, and in December of 1959
the defendant abandoned the mining claims and has not
clainwd ownership therein since that time.
Thereafter, plaintiff, San Juan County, proceeded
to foreclose its tax lien against the mining chLims, and
automatic tax sales were had under Section 59-10-33,
l '.C.A. 1953, based upon a lien for net proceeds taxes in
tlw Yl'nrs HJGO, 1961 and 1962.

A complaint by the plaintiffs herein was filed in
February of 1963 in the District Court of San Juan
County, which was answered by a motion to dismiss
filed by defendant. Issues raised on this motion were:
1. The State Tax C01nmission has no right to sue.
·) San Juan County has no right to sue.
3. There is no personal liability for real property
ta..~e~, including real property taxes based upon annual
nl't proceeds.

-t. The tax has been satisfied by sale of the property
to

San Juan County on preliminary tax sale.

The parties stipulated to additional facts, and the
matter as aforesaid was determined thereafter as if
on motion for suiiD1Iary judgn1ent, whereupon judgment
was entered for the defendant.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH IS A PROPER
PARTY HEREIN AND HAS A RIGHT TO PROSECUTE THIS
ACTION.

Sections 59-5-52 to 59-5-64, U.C.A. 195a, inclusive,
grant to the State Tax Commission the authority to
make assessments upon mines and provide the manner
of making such assessments. Section 59-6-2, U.C.A. 1953,
provides that the 'Tax Commission shall transmit to
the county auditor a statement of the property assessed
by it, and the county auditor is required to enter such
assessment on his assessment book or roll.
Section 59·-8-2, U.C.A. 1953, provides that taxes
resulting from an assessment of mines made by the State
Tax Commission shall be collected by the county treasurer in a similar manner to which state and county taxes
are collected.
Section 59·-5-46, U.'C.A. 1953, gives to the Commission
the power to sue and be sued in its own name; to have
and exercise general supervision over the administration
of the tax laws of the state and over assessors and over
county boards and over county officers in the performance of their duties in connection with assessment of
property and collection of taxes ; and further to direct
proceedings, actions and prosecutions to enforce the
laws relating to the penalties, liabilities and punishments
of persons and officers or agents of corporations for
failure or neglect to comply with the provisions of the
statutes governing the return, assess1nent and taxation
of property.
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It is ~ubmitt(•d that tltt• State Tax. Connnission nmy,
und1·r :-;lH'(·il'i(· statutory authority, join in this action
in un at tempt to collect taxt>s due, for and on behalf of
~an J unn County.
POINT II
SAN JUAN COUNTY IS A PROPER PARTY TO THIS
ACTION AND IS ENTITLED TO PROSECUTE THIS APPEAL
IN ITS OWN NAME.

It is eon tended by the defendant that the action
properly have been brought in the name of the
~an .J nan County Treasurer. While conceding that this
IH'rhaps would have been more appropriate, the plaintiffs
do not concede that the County is without authority to
prosecute such an action. Pursuant to Section 17-4-2,
P.C ..:\. 19;);~, a county can act only through the board of
county com1nissioners or agents and officers acting under
authority of such board or by other specific statutory
authority. Counties are given the specific power to sue
and be sued and to levy and collect taxes under their
t>xelm>ivP jurisdiction as authorized by law in Section
17 --t-:3. X owhere can a like provision be found allowing
thP trPastUl'l' to sue or be sued, except in Section 59-10-16,
which i~ specifically limited as set forth hereafter.
~hould

8t•dion 17 -5-:2±, U.C.A. 1953, gives to the county the
right to control and direct prosecution of various claims
and to defend the county in any matters to which it
might be a party. Section 17-5-50, U.C.A. 1953, provides
an onmibus clause granting the county any other powers
llt'l'Pssary to discharge the duties of a county. Section
17-.J-3-±. P.C.~l. 1953, provides authority for levying
bxt>s upon taxable property within a county for county
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purposes. Section 59-10-16, U.C.A. 1953, gives the county
treasurer authority to commence an action "in the name
of the county" to sue for and collect taxes levied in one
county on property thereafter removed to another county.
·The plaintiffs respectfully submit that the county
treasurer need not and should not, pursuant to the
statutes heretofore mentioned, be a party in the above
entitled action, and that San Juan County in its own
name is a proper party-plaintiff.

POINT III
THE NET PROCEEDS TAX LIABILITY IS PROPERLY
THE PERSONAL OBLIGATION OF THE OWNER OR OPERATOR OF THE MINE OR THE PERSON INCURRING
THE LIABILITY.

The mining claims in question operated by the
defendant are all unpatented ·claims. A patent is the
instrument by which the fee simple title to a mining
claim is granted. See 58 C.J .S., Mines and l\iinerals,
Sec. 97. Once patented, the property becomes private
property with which the former fee owner is no longer
concerned. Legal title to mineral lands is thereafter
vested in the patentee. Ibid. Sec. 114. See also Kahn v.
The Old Telegraph Mining Co., et al., 2 Utah 174.
·The primary question presented to the Court is
whether a mining c01npany incurs personal liability by
depleting mineral assets, paying no tax thereon, and
then abandoning the depleted mining claim, the fee title
to which was never owned by it.
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St·<·t ion r>~)-10-1,

U.l'.A. 1953, provides in part:

"Every tax has the effect of a judgment
against the person ... The judgment is not sati~fied nor the lien removed until the taxes are
paid or the property sold for the payment
thereof."
'l'h11~.

the Utah Legislature has provided direct authority
for J>Prsonal liability of property taxes within the State
of Utah. 1t is generally conceded that a tax can, by
~tatute, be declared to be a debt due or the personal obligation of the person doing the business upon which
tht> ta..x is levied or imposed. Accordingly, where a
~tatnh· ilnposes a tax, that makes no provision for its
eollection, it may be assumed that the legislature contnmplated thP enforcement of the tax by ordinary remediP~. and that debt or assumpsit will lie. The action in
~ueh cases i::; sustained upon the in1plied authority
from the legislature to collect the tax by the ordinary
means of collecting an obligation arising upon a contract,
express or irnplied. 251 Am. Jur., Sec. 984.
In Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781, after
st>tting forth the various statutory provisions allowing
personal liability, l\Ir. Justice Wolfe made the following
significant comments in a concurring opinion therein :
"Here the express language seems to imply
that the assessment is fundamentally against a
person and not against the property regardless
of person.
"Likewise, Section 80-5-14, dealing with undistributed or unpartitioned property of deceased
persons, may be assessed against their heirs,
guardians, executors or administrators or any
one of them, and the payment of taxes made by
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either binds all of the parties in interest for their
proportions. The assessment binds persons not
the property except as security for its pay1nent."
Ibid. p. 75
Mr. Justice Wolfe concluded:
"Certainly this smacks of .an assessment
against the person rather than a charge against
the realty alone - the tax debt being a lien
against the realty of the owner." Id. p. 75.
The case of Crystal Car Line et al v. State Tax
Commission, 110 Utah 426, 174 P.2d 984, held that a
general tax against personal property does not create a
lien on either the property assessed or other property of
the owner, but also significantly held that
The statutory provision that "every tax has the
effect of a judgment against the person" means
that the tax shall be collected in the same way
as a judgment unless otherwise expressly provided and limited.
The defendant contends that all statutes providing
for personal liability have been repealed. While this
is true of certain provisions of Utah law, the above cited
statutes are still in effect, and there is no direct statutory
language denying or limiting personal liability. The
plaintiffs can see no reason why an action may not lie
for unpaid taxes where the remedy provided by law
of sale is not practical. Such a position is supported
by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Larson in
the Crystal Car Line case, supra, at page 442:
". . . . I see no reason why an action may not lie
for unpaid taxes on personal property where the
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~mnma ry procPeding of seizure under the tax
laws is not pradical."

'fhe n·mt>dy providing for seizure and sale of real
property for ad valore1n taxation under Utah law is not
Pxelu~ive. ln the present case, where the fee title to
unpatPnted 1nining clahns is held normally by a taxt>Xt>mpt entity and the 1nine is depleted, it is fruitless
and unreali~ tic to attempt to enforce a tax obligation by
a ~wizun• of worthless property .
..:\ si1nilar situation occurred 1n the recent Alaska
case of City of Auchorage v. Baker, 376 P.2d 482 (1962)
wherein it was held that delinquent property taxes
against a leasehold interest in land owned by the United
~tates 1nay be collected by a personal action against th,.
taxpayer. There, under a written lease between the
taxpayer and the federally-owned Alaska Railroad, the
taxpayer was required to pay all taxes and assessments
levied on buildings or linprovements on the leased land.
The failure of the taxpayer to pay taxes due constituted
a cause for forfeiture of his rights as lessee. Alaska law
proYides for the foreclosure of a tax lien by sale of the
a::-:st.'s:~wd property in the event of delinquency, which is
::;imilar to Utah law. The court pointed out that the sale
of the leasehold interest in a tax foreclosure proceeding
would be a fruitless act. The court held it unrealistic
and unreasonable to regard this method as an exclusive
remedy under the circumstances. It concluded that,
where a method of collecting taxes provided by statute
i::-: not exclusive, and does not provide an effective remedy, a personal action could be brought.
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The conclusions suggested above are supported in
84 C.J.S., Taxation, Sec. 643, which reads:
". . . . In many jurisdictions the owner of real
estate is personally liable for taxes levied on
property and this is true notwithstanding the existence of a lien on the property for the collection
of taxes. Personal liability may exist even in the
absence of any provision for obtaining a personal
judgment for such taxes."
The defendant cites several cases arising under prior
law granting to the local county assessor the right to
bring a personal action for property taxes. Such statutes were repealed with the enactment of the Laws
of Utah 1933. The language, however, from these cases
is still pertinent in order to illustrate the Tax Commission's position herein. In the case of Crimson, Assessor,
and Salt Lake Cmtnty v. Rich, 2 Utah 111, involving
taxes for the year 1873, the Court said:
" .... Sections 353 and 360 of the Compiled Laws
of Utah afford ample and even summary powers
and means for the collection of taxes without
suit; and we think the rule is well settled that
when ample powers and means are afforded by
statute for the collection of taxes without suit, and
-when there is no statute providing for suit to be
brought for taxes, no action can be maintained
therefor .... " (Emphasis supplied.)
This is precisely the Tax Con1mission's contention in the
present case: the statute does not afford mnple power
and means to collect the taxes mved by J en, Inc., on its
n1ining operations unless personal liability for the taxes
·will lie against the taxpayer.
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Contrary to the dissenting op1n1on expressed by
~Lr. Justice \Y olfe in C ry.stal Car Line et al. v. State
Tax Commission, 110 Utah 426, 17-! P.2d 984, the tax
obligation which is given the effect of a judgment is
a judgment. It can be sued on in another state and as
sueh is entitled to full faith and credit in a foreign
jurisdiction. See State of Ohio, Dept. of Taxation v.
Kliech Bros., 357 Mich. 504, 98 N.W.2d 636; City of New
York v. Shapiro et al., 129 F. Supp. 149.
It would be particularly incongruous to grant to the
Tax Comn1ission the right to sue upon a tax obligation
in a foreign state and obtain a personal liability against
a taxpayer who had removed hhnself from the juridiction
of the State of Utah and, at the same time, to refuse
to allow the Commission or the county to sue upon a
similar obligation in the state where the obligation was
incurred. The plaintiffs submit that there is sufficient
statutory authority under the Utah Code to allow the
relief prayed for, and even in the absence of specific
authority, personal liability may exist where the public
inten'st. would be unfairly deprived of tax revenues in
the absence of such re1nedy.

POINT IV
THE TAX LIABILITY INCURRED BY THE DEFENDANT IS NOT SATISFIED UPON A SALE OF ITS MINING
CLAIMS AT PRELIMINARY TAX SALE.

It has been stipulated that the mining claims of the
defendant were sold on a preliminary tax sale for delinquent net proceeds taxes assessed against the defendant.
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This automatic preliminary sale was first had for delinquent taxes for the operations for the year 1960,
and thereafter a similar sale was had for delinquent net
proceeds taxes for the years 1961 and 1962. The
defendant argues that the Utah statute contemplates
that the tax lien shall be satisfied by the sale of the
particular property upon which the delinquency was
assessed to the county. It argues that even if personal
liability for a tax can be justified under Utah statutes
that there can be no further liability following the
prelin1inary sale to the county because such sale satisfies
the tax. In support of this proposition it cites Section
59-10-1, U.C.A. 1953, which provides as follows:

"TAX HAS EFFECT OF JUDGMENT LIEN HAS EFFECT OF EXECUTION. Every tax has the effect of a judgment against
the person, and every lien created by this title
has the force· and effect of an execution duly
levied against all personal property of the delinquent. The judgment is not satisfied nor the lien
retnoved until the taxes are paid or the property
sold for the payment thereof." (Emphasis supplied.)

Apparently, the trial court below placed considerable
emphasis upon this statute. On page 5 of the memorandum decision issued by Judge l{eller, he states:
"Even accepting the conclusions of Justice
to the effect that the levy of a tax is an
assessment against the person, it appears to me
that the only reasonable contsruction that can
be given to the language of 59-10-1 is this: that
the judgment as defined in the case last above
cited is satisfied by payment of the tax or by

vV olfe
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a forPe losure of the lien upon the real property
to which it was attached."
The plaintiffs subn1it that the sale contemplated by
~Pdion :JH-10-1, U.C.A. 1953, is not a sale of property,
a:-; <'onb•mplated hy this act. The only property which
wa:-; :-;uhjPct to tht> prelilninary sale by San Juan County
ht>rt>in was the deplded 1nining clailn owned by the defendant which, as has been stipulated, was abandoned
prior to January 1, 1960. At the tilne of foreclosure the
defendant had /J: legal right in the mining claims, and
the adion of San Juan County in purporting to foreclose
the same was a 1neaningless gesture. Even if the foreelo:-;nrP had be('n valid, it is suggested that the county's
n•medy would have been 1neaningless because of the fact
that the defendant did not own the fee title to the prop\•rty, and the sale of an abandoned and depleted mining
clailn to the county through the automatic entry repre::wntt•d by the preliminary tax sale can scarcely be found
to have satisfied a six hundred thousand dollar obligation.
Furthennore, the sale and foreclosure proceedings
provided by Utah statute and referred to by defendant
are deemed to be only a cumulative remedy. Section
59-10--±7, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"Such foreclosure shall not deprive the county
of any other method or n1eans provided for the
collection or enforcement any such taxes, but
shall be deemed and construed as providing an
additional or cumulative remedy for the collection
of general taxes levied and assessed against the
real estate in such county." See also Fisher v.
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TiVright, 101 Utah 469, 123 P.2d 703, and Ansmt
v. Ellison, 104 Utah 576, 140 P.2d 653.
While there could be some questions as to which
"foreclosure" is referred to in the preceding section,
it is subrnitted by the appellants that the automatic
preliminary sale provided for by Section 59-10-33, U.C.A.
1953, should not be construed to be an e~clusive remedy
for collection or enforcement of taxes where the foreclosure of lien after final sale is specifically deemed not
to be exclusive.
Furthermore, if l\1r. Justice Wolfe is correct in his
assumption stated in Hayes 1J. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, that
the Utah tax is a debt against the individual owning the
property and a lien on his property and therefo.re
"smacks of an assessn1ent against the person, rather than
a judgment against the realty alone," it would appear
that, while the lien against the property might be satisfied after the sale of the property to the county on preliminary tax sale, that nevertheless, the judgment against
the person could not be satisfied until the taxe were paid
or a statute of limitations had run. The defendant is
asking that the Court find that a sale of the property
for little or no consideration satisfies the effect of a
judgment against a person resulting from delinquent
property taxes. This request is unwarranted under Utah
statute and certainly operates to place taxing authorities
under an insunnountable burden in collecting taxes on
properties.
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CONCLUSION
Utah statutes contemplate personal liability for
delinquent mining taxes. The remedy of foreclosure
and sale afforded to the county for the collection of
taxes is not exclusive, and as the State of Utah and San
,Juan County st8Jld to suffer irreparable loss if a mining
company is allowed to deplete the mineral assets of the
state without paying a tax thereon, it is submitted that
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
F. BURTON HOWARD
Assistant Attorney General
F. BENNION REDD
San Juan County Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Appellants
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